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HOW CONCEPCION KILLED THE PRIVACY
CLASS ACTION
Jessica L. Hubley†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In its 2011 AT&T v. Concepcion opinion,1 the Supreme Court
may have given the web industry a lightweight but impenetrable
shield against most privacy-based user claims. To understand why,
one must understand the nature of the activity that gives rise to such
claims, the contracts that govern such claims, and the legal industry
that brings such claims.
An ever-increasing portion of our daily lives and our daily
commerce occurs over the Internet. We have no choice but to rely
upon online service providers to facilitate that conduct, and those
providers often fund operations through advertising. That advertising
is increasingly sophisticated, targeted, and conducted by multiple
third parties. Those third parties and first-party providers alike must
know who we are and what we like to generate revenue from targeted
advertising.
A quilt of facts about ourselves and our context fuel such
advertising, including our names, email addresses, locations, IP
addresses, gender, browsing histories, social security numbers,
hardware fingerprints, expressed preferences, sexual orientation, and
consumer selections, to name a few. Online service providers use
sophisticated technological mechanisms to gather and analyze this
information, and this need not be a bad thing. Disclosure, too, can be
utterly innocuous under many circumstances. Yet disclosure to the
wrong parties under the wrong circumstances can embarrass us, result
in identity theft, result in harassment, or unexpectedly destroy the
reputations we’ve spent a lifetime building.

† Jessica L. Hubley is an independent privacy advisor consulting clients on privacy
compliance and privacy by design techniques for software and web products. Ms. Hubley is a
Certified Information Privacy Professional (CIPP), a former associate at Latham & Watkins
LLP and Dickstein Shapiro LLP, and a graduate of Stanford Law School.
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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In many cases, in order to interact with the Internet, we must
agree to give a service provider personal or sensitive information, and
with that gift we assume a certain risk of loss or disclosure. Even a
service provider who makes every effort to keep confidential every
snippet it knows about you can be hacked. In many cases, the service
provider must (or feels it must) tell some of the information it knows
about you to others, whether to bill you or to serve you ads.2 There
are restrictions on what the provider can do under some circumstances
with some information, and the Federal Trade Commission has made
a practice of bringing enforcement actions against companies it feels
have used personal information in a way that is unfair or deceptive.3
However, there is no statute preventing a provider from disclosing
any personal information about you in a way that causes you harm;
preventing such harm is normally the purview of common law.
If a stockholder loses money because the company misbehaved,
the stockholder can join other stockholders and sue the company,
even if she lost only a penny. Users of websites and Internet services
presently try to remedy providers’ misconduct through similar
collective means: the privacy class action. Realistically, however,
lawyers will not agree to represent a disgruntled stockholder or user
who can’t pay legal fees in exchange for a potential reward of onethird of a cent. This is why nearly every enduring stockholder
derivative suit eventually becomes a class action, and likely why
almost every “privacy” suit has as well.
Yet online privacy claims have one key distinguishing feature
from shareholder derivative actions: they arise under terms dictated
unilaterally by the web provider, and few users read (much less agree
with) these terms.4 We’ve accepted this, societally and judicially, as
necessary to make the conduct of business online economically
efficient. After all, if a provider tries to make us unwittingly agree to
something truly egregious, we are at liberty to argue that such terms
2. Service providers often outsource functions such as billing, shipping, server storage,
customer support, or analytics on the website. While many of these functions could theoretically
be performed by the service provider itself, the service provider often finds it more cost
effective to use a specialist third party to handle such functions. Ad service is a slightly different
concern, since a website could serve ads on its own behalf without sharing any information with
the advertiser. However, advertisers are routinely willing to pay more for targeted ads that
reference the users’ demographic information than they are for banner ads that are user-agnostic.
Web companies often deem profits from targeted advertising necessary to the profitable
administration of their business.
3. Namely, under section 45(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (2010).
4. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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were unconscionable and therefore unenforceable contracts.
In 2011, however, the Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T v.
Concepcion made clear that it did not consider an agreement to
arbitrate on an individual basis in form terms of service
unconscionable.5 If a provider required the individual arbitration of
disputes in its form agreement, the consumer is required to abide by
that procedure absent the applicability of another contract defense. As
a practical matter, this means that each claim of a website’s user must
be brought to an arbitrator as a single action and resolved; an
aggrieved user cannot join her action with that of other similarlysituated users to aggregate damages. Therefore, an aggrieved user,
harmed by disclosure of her personal information in an uncertain way
or relatively small measure, must spend significant legal fees that
grossly exceed her potential recovery to bring a claim at all. She is not
likely to do so, nor is there likely to be a lawyer who would accept a
contingency arrangement for that case. From the lawyer’s perspective,
the case is not worth her time.
This article explains how the ruling in AT&T v. Concepcion
combined with a provider’s relatively painless insertion of a single
paragraph in form terms—which few read and fewer contest—may
act to immunize that provider from all privacy class action suits.
II. THE OKCUPID EXAMPLE
To ground this discussion, I refer to the as yet unfiled case of
OKCupid. OKCupid.com is a free dating website where users fill out
profiles about themselves, under fake handles that need not reflect
real names, in an attempt to find a mate.6 A user can provide his or
her age, preferences regarding children, education level, drinking
frequency, drug use frequency (which drugs are not specified by the
form), income, religion, and smoking frequency, among other items. 7
As a free site, OKCupid functions in part by serving ads to its users.8
To do so, OKCupid shares, by way of cookie transmission, a user’s
age, whether they have cats or dogs, preferences regarding children,
drinking frequency, drug use frequency, country, gender, ethnicity,

5. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. As discussed at length infra Parts V-VII, this decision
dealt with a form agreement but not online terms. However, it has been applied to cases brought
under form online terms in its short history.
6. See OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
7. See OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com/profile (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) (free
signup required).
8. See id.
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education level, income, job sector, language proficiencies, religion,
smoking frequency, state and ZIP code—each with at least one thirdparty advertiser.9 In the case of “drug use,” a user’s answer can imply
medical information if his or her state has legalized medical
marijuana. If populated by a user, this information is visible to other
OKCupid users logged into the service, but as associated with a
sometimes-anonymous handle.
To be clear, I have not discovered publicity of any specific harm
to any specific individual because of disclosure to these advertisers.
Nor is there any suggestion that either has used this information for
any purpose other than to serve ads. But there is also no suggestion
that the advertisers are restricted from other uses. There may be an
increased likelihood of future harm to OKCupid users if one of the
many advertisers or OKCupid chooses to, for example, sell this
information to insurance providers who use it to hike premiums.
OKCupid does not disclose this sharing in its privacy policy, 10
nor does it obtain express permission to share customer data in its
terms of service.11 OKCupid’s terms of service do not currently
require users to arbitrate disputes with the website.12 Without alleging
any wrongdoing on OKCupid’s part, I’ve used this practice for
illustrative purposes in this article.
III. THE PRESENT LANDSCAPE OF PRIVACY-BASED CLASS ACTIONS
Both statutory and common law claims may fall under the broad
umbrella of “privacy” actions. At common law, such actions are
generally tort claims for invasion of privacy, false light, disclosure of
confidential information, and violations of constitutional privacy
rights.13 State and federal statutes additionally impose certain privacy

9. Jonathan Mayer, Tracking the Trackers: Where Everybody Knows Your Username,
THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Oct. 11, 2011, 8:06 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6740.
10. See Legal Information, OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com/legal/privacy (last visited
Aug. 1, 2012).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a
laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and
social security numbers); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-CV-01726-LHK, 2011 WL 6303898
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 11-CV01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011) (plaintiff’s general
allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was
insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was
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obligations upon the public and upon industry.14 State statutes, for
example, may generally ensure a right to privacy and proper use of
some items of personal information, such as likeness, or those related
to consumers’ rights generally.15 Claims under federal statutes in
privacy-based actions may fall under a number of statutes governing
specific items of personal information,16 or specific means of
communicating or disclosing personal information.17
As a practical matter, claimants offended by some disclosure of
their personal information—which may include their names,
addresses, email addresses, likeness, ID numbers, social security
numbers, credit card numbers, browsing histories, video viewing
histories, etc.—sue on multiple statutory and common law grounds.18
purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic
value of his data); In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963,
at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile
device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “valuefor-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Cohen v.
Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094-96 (N.D. Cal. 2011); LaCourt v. Specific Media,
Inc., No. SACV 10-1256, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (plaintiffs’
reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by
consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to
establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this
case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.
Supp. 2d 1102, 1109-12 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s
collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card
numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding
plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and
domestic violence); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326-27
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their
personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a thirdparty data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting argument that the economic
value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual
consumer).
14. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS (2011).
15. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012) (California’s right of publicity statute);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-09 (West 2012) (California’s unfair competition law).
16. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06
(2010); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010); Video Privacy Protection Act
of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (2010); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-25 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22,
2701-09 (2010); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. (2010) (lacking a private right of action); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-09 (2010).
18. Few suits have yet addressed specifically the disclosure of more “sensitive”
information, such as health information or sexual orientation information. For one example, see
Doe 1, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1109-11.
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In most instances, these cases have been brought in California courts,
presumably due to choice of forum and law provisions in the terms of
service governing offending websites predominately headquartered in
California.19
Such cases face numerous challenges, among them the difficulty
of proving standing where alleged damages are either very small or
very difficult to ascertain—based on embarrassment, humiliation,
“injury,” without further description, or the unquantified, inherent
economic value of one’s personal information.20 However, for
purposes of this article, the small measure of damages available under
any such claims is relevant. In recent cases, plaintiffs have generally
alleged damages based upon (1) the disclosure of their names,
addresses, IDs, or other similar information to a third party, usually an
advertiser, often via cookies,21 or (2) the use of their personal
information for impermissible purposes such as advertisement of
other’s goods.22 While plaintiffs have been creative in their assertions
of the value of personal information (but not necessarily the value of
that information remaining secret),23 such cases have not generally
alleged large measures of individual damages.24
This does not necessarily mean that there is no public interest in
preventing online businesses from haphazardly disclosing users’
personal information. A number of societal harms threaten: the
business’ employee accessing user information in order to do the user
some harm or simply sign them up for an offensive magazine
subscription; a third-party advertiser’s gaining the capacity to place
unwanted, even malicious, code on users’ machines; a hacker
19. See supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal.
2011); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714-15 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
21. Such actions have not generally survived a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *2; In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011
WL 4403963, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding no loss of money or property where
plaintiffs, users of mobile devices, alleged that defendants violated their privacy rights by
allowing third-party application developers to collect and make use of their personal information
for commercial purposes, without user consent or knowledge); Thompson v. Home Depot, Inc.,
No. 07cv1058 IEG (WMc), 2007 WL 2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (finding no loss
of money or property where plaintiff alleged that defendant required customers to provide their
personal information as a condition to performing a credit card transaction and used such
information for marketing purposes).
22. See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-CV-01726-LHK, 2011 WL 6303898 at *20
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011).
23. See, e.g., Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *3-6.
24. See supra note 13.
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accessing and making purchases based upon payment information
stored with the provider (perhaps by way of information in an illadvised cookie); or an insurer crawling a user’s cookies for
information about their illnesses or drug use and changing premiums
based on that information. However, as with these harms, many
potential harms would not occur but for the actions of parties other
than the user and the online business. This is but one difficulty with
claims based upon existing privacy statutes. These potential harms
could cause significant monetary damage to the user in the future. But
it is substantially harder to elucidate the monetary damage
proximately caused by the online business’ mere disclosure. When
plaintiffs have succeeded securing standing and defeating a motion to
dismiss by describing potential damages sufficiently, the damage to
each individual involved in the action is admittedly rather small—
well under $5,000.25 Yet a lawyer billing $250 an hour will spend
many times that amount to simply prepare and file a complaint.
With such de minimis individual damages, it is only
economically feasible for a law firm to bring such claims on
contingency in two circumstances: (1) where the pursuit of the claim
on a class wide basis can result in aggregate claims that would make
the thirty to forty percent contingency award cover and exceed the
firm’s expenses in litigating the claims; or (2) where the lawyer or
plaintiff is willing to spend money she can’t recoup as a matter of
principle. It seems the incidence of the second circumstance is quite
small. Therefore, practically speaking, claims based merely on the
disclosure (and, at times, the mishandling) of users’ personal
information are unlikely to be brought other than as a class action. In
the absence of class relief, it is reasonable to expect that such claims
will never be filed.
IV. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ONLINE TERMS OF SERVICE
Most Americans now do some business over the Internet—
whether making purchases or participating in a community at the
pleasure of a forum host. When we do, we are almost always
presented (clearly or opaquely) with contractual terms governing our
use of the site. The rules of enforceability of these contracts stem
from the rule created in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,26 which is
that form contracts are not unenforceable as contracts of adhesion
25. See, e.g., Fraley, 2011 WL 6303898, at *16 (describing damages claims no greater
than a $750 minimum statutory penalty).
26. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
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because the cost of negotiating agreements with each and every
customer is onerous and industry must be able to use forms to do
business efficiently.27
The two polar categories of online terms—between which there
are many variations—are “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements.
Clickwrap agreements loosely refer to the assent process by which a
user must click “I agree” or some variation of it to enter or use the
software or website. Browsewrap agreements refer more generally to
the circumstance where an online host dictates that assent is given
merely by using the site. Alternately, a user may receive an email
notifying him or her of terms or changes thereto, or may be forced to
check a box indicating assent to certain terms before being allowed to
use the site—processes closer to the “clickwrap” variation.
The clickwrap version of online terms, where a user acts
affirmatively to indicate assent and has been given clear presentation
of the terms, is generally held to be enforceable.28 Such decisions turn
on the presence of (1) reasonable notice of the terms and (2) a
reasonable opportunity to review them.29 In Feldman, for example, a
27. Id. See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods
and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and
costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual
transactions.”).
28. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also In
re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *1, *5-6 (N.D. Ill.
May 11, 2000) (finding reasonable notice of clickwrap agreement terms existed where the user
had to agree to the terms in order to install software, the agreement came in a small pop-up
window, in the same font-size as words in the computer’s own display, and with the arbitration
clause located at the end of the agreement); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007,
1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (holding that adequate notice was provided of clickwrap agreement terms
where users had to click “Accept” to agree to the terms in order to subscribe, an admonition in
capital letters was presented at the top of the agreement to read the agreement carefully, the
thirteen-page agreement appeared in a scroll box with only portions visible at a time, and the
forum selection clause was located in the final section and presented in lower case font); Caspi
v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 532-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(finding that reasonable notice of the terms of a clickwrap agreement was provided where the
user had to click “I agree” before proceeding with registration, the agreement was presented in a
scrollable window, and the forum selection clause was presented in lower case letters in the last
paragraph of the agreement); cf. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (finding that reasonable notice of the terms of a browsewrap agreement was not provided
when a hyperlink to the terms appeared in small gray print on a gray background).
29. See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (“That the user would have to scroll through the
text box of the Agreement to read it in its entirety does not defeat notice because there was
sufficient notice of the Agreement itself and clicking ‘Yes’ constituted assent to all of the terms.
The preamble, which was immediately visible, also made clear that assent to the terms was
binding. The Agreement was presented in readable 12-point font. It was only seven paragraphs
long—not so long so as to render scrolling down to view all of the terms inconvenient or
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court ruled that this enforceability was not destroyed by the absence
of a price term.30 It also was unconcerned, as earlier decisions had
been, with the clickwrap’s adhesive nature.31 However, some of the
dicta in Feldman suggested that certain provisions might be
unconscionable in form terms in other circumstances, for example
where the provision prevents a litigant from enforcing a
constitutionally-protected right.32 It also assessed whether certain
mitigating factors would render the terms unenforceable—including
fraud, overreaching, coercion, and deprivation of a judicial venue—
but found that none did in the case at hand.33 There is no requirement
that a user actually read the terms or any part of the terms, however,
as long as the user had notice that there were terms and she had a
reasonable opportunity to review them.34
In practice, such rulings have created a sliding scale of
enforceability:35 the more notice of the terms and the opportunity the
user is afforded to review them, the more likely a court will deem
those terms enforceable. Some online companies appear to care more
about this than others. Most readers will have noticed the constant
pop-up terms that accompany every update to a piece of Apple
software. Most will also have visited at least one website whose only
notice of the terms is a link to them in six-point font, tucked at the
impossible. A printer-friendly, full-screen version was made readily available. The user had
ample time to review the document.”).
30. Id. at 238 (citing Portnoy v. Brown, 243 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1968)). See also 1 WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, CONTRACTS § 142 (2006) (“[T]he complete absence of any mention of
the price is not necessarily fatal: The contract may be interpreted to mean the market price or a
reasonable price.”).
31. A contract of adhesion is a form or standardized contract prepared by a party of
superior bargaining power, to be signed by the party in the weaker position, who only has the
opportunity to agree to the contract or reject it, without an opportunity to negotiate or bargain.
See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (Cal. 2000); cf. McNulty
v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267, 1273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). As of Feldman, the opinion left
some ambiguity as to whether the contract could be proved adhesive, unconscionable, and
unenforceable if all vendors of that service had a “similar process.” Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at
237.
32. Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (citing Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d
256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding unreasonable a 30-day limitations period for any claim arising
out of an employment agreement)). Note, however, that a severability clause, in which the
agreement states than any provision found unenforceable will not affect the enforceability of the
entire agreement but will rather be deemed extracted from it, could fix this issue for the drafter
of online terms.
33. See id. at 246-48.
34. See id. at 237-38.
35. Ed Bayley, The Clicks That Bind: Ways Users “Agree” to Online Terms of Service,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 16, 2009), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-terms-ofservice-whitepaper.pdf.
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bottom corner of a webpage. The difference in notice is significant.
In the last two years, courts around the country have also
repeatedly enforced what I’ll call “semi-clickwrap” agreements, in
which the user must click something to “assent” to terms or to sign up
after being presented with only a link to those terms. In Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., for example, a Facebook user challenged the venue
selection clause included in the site’s Terms of Use.36 Facebook’s
signup process involved, at the relevant time, completion of online
forms containing profile information followed by a “Sign Up” button;
next to this button was a link to Facebook’s Terms.37 The Fteja court
collected cases from numerous jurisdictions in which an affirmative
click of some kind, where the clicked button was near a hyperlink to
Terms, was deemed to constitute assent and form a binding contract.38
Interestingly, the court stated “at least for those to whom the
[I]nternet is in an indispensable part of daily life, clicking the
hyperlinked phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning
over the cruise ticket [as in Carnival] . . . [w]hether or not the
consumer bothers to look is irrelevant.”39
In situations where terms are hidden on the website and are
assented to not by some acknowledging action of the user but instead
by mere “use of the website,” the question of whether those terms are
enforceable is a closer one.40 For example, where software
36. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 918(RJH), 2012 WL 183896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2012). As used herein, “Terms” refers generally to a website’s Terms of Use, Terms and
Conditions, End-user License Agreement, or a similar user agreement.
37. Id. at *5-6.
38. Id. at *7-11 (citing in support of the enforceability of click-wrap agreements, inter
alia, Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459; Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585, 587 (1991); Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Centrifugal Force,
Inc. v. Softnet Commc’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463 (CM)(GWG), 2011 WL 744732, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011); Snap-on Bus. Solutions Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp.
2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Major v. McCallister, 302
S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005). But see Grosvenor v. Qwest Comm’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-2848-WDM-KMT, 2010
WL 3906253, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010) (declining to enforce terms of a “semi-clickwrap”
agreement).
39. Fteja, 2012 WL 183896, at *10 (citing Centrifugal Force, 2011 WL 744732, at *7
(enforcing clickwrap agreement) (“Failure to read a contract before agreeing to its terms does
not relieve a party of its obligations under the contract.”)).
40. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[I]n
circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download free software at the
immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen
is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms.”);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Verio’s argument might
well be persuasive if its queries addressed to Register’s computers had been sporadic and
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downloaded from a website includes terms but the terms must be
searched out or the user has no reason to look for them where they sit,
those terms have been held unenforceable.41 Similarly, where terms
for downloaded software were obscured during the installation
process “in such a way that the average, non-expert consumer would
not notice the hyperlink” to them, the Northern District of Illinois has
refused to enforce them.42 The Western District of Washington, at
least, has also refused to enforce browsewrap agreements where the
actual terms were three landing pages past a hyperlink emailed to the
customer in an order confirmation.43 It is therefore possible to obscure
a website’s terms so much that the requisite notice is not present.
infrequent. If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if it had submitted only a few
sporadic queries, that would give considerable force to its contention that it obtained the
WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended to impose conditions, and without
being deemed to have accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was daily submitting numerous
queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the terms Register exacted.
Furthermore, Verio admits that it knew perfectly well what terms Register demanded. Verio’s
argument fails.”); Harris v. comScore, Inc., No. 11 C 5807, 2011 WL 4738357, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 7, 2011) (“It is true . . . that the plaintiffs in this case should have seen the reference to the
agreement and the requirement that they acknowledge that they read it before commencing their
download. Nonetheless, it is not reasonable to expect a user casually downloading free software
to search for such an agreement if it is not immediately available and obvious where to obtain
it.”) (denying motion to transfer venue in accordance with the agreement); Hines v.
Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG
Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff was “highly likely to
succeed in showing that Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use and assented to them by
actually using the website” where site displayed a warning that “use of this Website is subject to
express Terms of Use” and “[t]he underlined phrase ‘Terms of Use’ is a hyperlink to the full
Terms of Use”); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (rejecting Ticketmaster’s application for a preliminary injunction
to enforce posted terms of use of data available on its website against a regular user and noting
that the user of Ticketmaster’s website is not required to check an “I agree” box before
proceeding, the court concluded that there was insufficient proof of agreement to support a
preliminary injunction). Cf. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (“[A] browse wrap license is part of the web site and the user assents to the contract when
the user visits the web site.”).
41. Compare Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 402 (citing Specht, 306 F.3d 17)
(“Netscape’s posting of its terms [linked to, but not present on the same page] did not compel
the conclusion that its downloaders took the software subject to those terms because there was
no way to determine that any downloader had seen the terms of the offer. There was no basis for
imputing to the downloaders of Netscape’s software knowledge of the terms on which the
software was offered.”), with Fteja, 2012 WL 183896 (enforcing terms linked near an
affirmative user click but not present on the page with the click and arguably eroding the
holding in Specht).
42. See Harris, 2011 WL 4738357 (reasoning that hyperlink to terms was obscured
during software installation, terms of the agreement were not reasonably available during the
installation process, and the location of the agreement was not readily apparent to users).
43. See Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. C09-1392JLR, 2012 WL 32380 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
3, 2012).
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In our example, OKCupid’s terms are visible before registration,
but only by (1) clicking a small link at the bottom of the homepage
reading “About OKCupid Free Online Dating,”44 (2) scrolling below
23 employee profiles with pictures and clicking “Legal,”45 and then
encountering the terms in one of three tabs.46 The terms state that
“[b]y directing your browser to this Website or otherwise accessing
the pages of this Website, you accept these terms of use. Humor
Rainbow [OKCupid’s parent company] may change the terms of use
at any time at its sole discretion.”47 They do not identify any
notification procedure for updates to these terms.48
However, under certain circumstances courts deem even such
passive acceptances binding.49 The Fteja court collected and analyzed
such decisions and noted that (1) cases where browsewrap agreements
not apparent from website use were enforced have often “turned on
the user’s constructive knowledge of the hyperlinked terms” and (2)
“the cases in which courts have enforced browsewrap agreements
have involved users who are businesses rather than . . . consumers [as
in Specht].”50 Both findings suggest that courts may be more likely to

44. OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
45. About Us, OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com/about/okcupid (last visited Aug. 6,
2012).
46. Legal Information, OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com/legal/terms (last visited Apr.
14, 2012).
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004).
Verio contends that it nonetheless never became contractually bound to the
conditions imposed by Register’s restrictive legend because, in the case of each
query Verio made, the legend did not appear until after Verio had submitted the
query and received the WHOIS data. Accordingly, Verio contends that in no
instance did it receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register
intended to impose. Verio therefore argues it should not be deemed to have taken
WHOIS data from Register’s systems subject to Register’s conditions.
Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries addressed to
Register’s computers had been sporadic and infrequent. If Verio had submitted
only one query, or even if it had submitted only a few sporadic queries, that
would give considerable force to its contention that it obtained the WHOIS data
without being conscious that Register intended to impose conditions, and without
being deemed to have accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was daily
submitting numerous queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the
terms Register exacted. Furthermore, Verio admits that it knew perfectly well
what terms Register demanded. Verio’s argument fails.
Id. The court noted, however, that the first use might not warrant enforcing the terms; it was the
repeated use of the site and exposure to the notice that made a difference here. Id.
50. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 918(RJH), 2012 WL 183896, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2012).
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enforce even a “pure” browsewrap agreement where the user is, by
her character or circumstances, likely to know terms are present—
whether the website makes that presence apparent or not.
This analysis may differ, at least under California law, where
assent to revised terms of service is at issue.51 Specifically, where the
website host has provided some notice that terms have changed and
stated that continued use of the service after such notice binds a user,
courts have been willing to enforce the update.52 By contrast, where
terms provide that they may be changed “from time to time” by the
website host, merely by posting revised terms on the website—even
where the terms expressly state that the user accepts any such revised
terms—such revisions have been held unenforceable.53 For example,
in Douglas v. US Dist. Ct., the Ninth Circuit, relying on the lack of
notice of the revised terms, held that a user was not bound by terms
revised, posted to a website, and containing provisions for (1) new
service charges, (2) a class action waiver, (3) arbitration of disputes,
and (4) a new choice of law, even though he continued to use the

51. See generally Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062 (9th
Cir. 2007).
52. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (enforcing revised agreement only because use of the service “after notice that Terms
have changed indicate[d] acceptance of the Terms”); MySpace, Inc. v. The Globe.com, Inc., No.
CV 06-3391-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 1686966, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007) (holding a
revised agreement was not unenforceable because of unconscionability where (1) defendant had
choices of other similar websites to use instead and (2) defendant had notice); cf. Badie v. Bank
of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 286-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a revised contract
containing an arbitration clause is unenforceable against existing customers, even when they are
given notice by mail).
53. See Roling v. E*Trade Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that agreement stating that “E*TRADE Securities may modify the fee structure at any
time by posting a modified structure on its Web site,” and “I understand that this Agreement
may be amended from time to time by E*TRADE Securities, with revised terms posted on the
E*TRADE Financial Web site. I agree to check for updates to this Agreement. I understand that
by continuing to maintain my Securities Brokerage Account without objecting to revised terms
of this Agreement, I am accepting the terms of the Revised Agreement and I will be legally
bound by its terms and conditions” were “sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment based
on unenforceability.”); Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., No. CV 10-04461 SJO (JCGx), 2010 WL
5289537, at *2-3, *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (holding revised forum selection clause
enforceable against plaintiff who had received an e-mail notice of revised terms and future
effective date thereof in the face of evidence that the user had clicked to view the revised
agreement multiple times, but refusing to enforce the agreement because enforcement would
deprive Plaintiff of a CLRA claim); cf. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 2d 696, 706 (D. Md. 2008) (applying Mississippi law to determine that revisions were
enforceable where website host attempted to disclaim amendment during litigation and relying
in part on the principle that ambiguous contract terms are construed against the drafter,
distinguishing Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 116, 118-19 (Miss. 2005)
on that basis).
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website for years.54 Courts have also suggested that a party’s failure
to follow the notice procedures it set forth in its previous terms can
render revised terms unenforceable.55 This analysis is doctrinally
consistent with the enforceability of pure browsewrap agreements, in
general.
The current state of the law seems to be that most online
agreements can be deemed enforceable under at least some
circumstances, but that a website can place its terms obscurely
enough to destroy enforceability as well. In the Apple iteration, where
the full agreement appears in a pop up window with an “I accept”
button, or the Facebook iteration, where the terms are hyperlinked
near an affirmative click, courts are likely to find that an enforceable
contract was made. While browsewrap agreements have greater
enforceability issues, analysis of case-specific facts may warrant
enforcing those as well. Neither manner of enforcement turns on
whether the user has read the terms; in fact, in no case reviewed for
this article did a user admit to having read any part of the terms before
using the website or clicking to accept.
Realistically, few Internet users bother to read terms of service.
Imagine browsing the Internet but stopping at each new site to read 5
to 50 pages of boring, somewhat scary legalese and you’ll understand
why. While no academic study appears to have been performed on
this point, various news outlets have polled readers to discover what

54. Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066 (“Douglas claims that he authorized AOL to charge his
credit card automatically and Talk America continued this practice, so he had no occasion to
visit Talk America’s website to pay his bills. Even if Douglas had visited the website, he would
have had no reason to look at the contract posted there. Parties to a contract have no obligation
to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side.
Indeed, a party can’t unilaterally change the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s
consent before doing so. . . . This is because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not
bind the parties until it is accepted.” (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R., 549 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1976) and Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass’n v.
Monaghan, 188 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951))); Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286-87 (holding that
a revised contract containing an arbitration clause is unenforceable against existing customers,
even when they are given notice by mail).
55. See DIRECTTV, Inc. v. Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626, 634-35 (Md. 2003) (holding that
simply sending the revised agreement did not satisfy the plain meaning of the prior agreement’s
requirement of notice describing the change because it did not “let [the subscriber] know . . .
what that change entailed,” where DIRECTTV had mailed another agreement to the subscriber
that appeared to be nearly identical to the prior agreement, but importantly contained certain
changes that were neither highlighted nor separately described, including the addition of a new
provision purporting to subject all disputes under the agreement to binding arbitration); cf. 17A
C.J.S. Contracts § 409 (2012) (stating that while parties may agree in advance to a method for
modifying an agreement, such method is not exclusive, and the parties are free to choose another
method of modification, thereby waiving the originally agreed provisions for modification).
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percentage of users read any terms on the websites they visit; a poll
by The Guardian found that seven percent of users read some terms
of use;56 a poll by The Telegraph found that seventy percent of users
never read any terms of use.57 One United Kingdom gaming website
played an April Fool’s joke where assent to its terms, automatic by
use of the website, gave the company rights in the user’s immortal
soul.58 The gaming company provided an opt-out, and had only a
twelve percent opt-out rate—including during the period after the
prank was publicized.59 None of these surveys make clear whether the
users who represented that they read terms of service regularly or in a
particular instance read every word, skimmed through, or just scrolled
down. However, it seems clear that Internet users don’t usually bother
to read terms. Unfortunately, that has little to do with whether the
terms can be enforced against them.60
Fifty years ago it would be reasonable to expect a court to refuse
to enforce, as adhesive or unconscionable, a contract appearing in a
dark corner of an express oil change station, in tiny print, which no
customer claimed to have seen, disclaiming all liability of the oil
change outfit for putting acid in the oil tank. Today, we can expect
that many—if not most—of our online consumer relationships rely
upon the enforcement of a similar contract.
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN AT&T V. CONCEPCION
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T v.
Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act required the
enforcement of arbitration provisions which California law had
previously held to be unconscionable.61 Practically, this holding may
act as a bar to any class action suit arising from consumer transactions
conducted over the Internet if the website host has included an
arbitration provision in its terms of service.

56. Rebecca Smithers, Terms and Conditions: Not Reading the Small Print Can Mean
Big Problems, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2000, 2:00 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2011/may/11/terms-conditions-small-print-big-problems.
57. Companies Use Apps to Harvest Users’ Personal Information, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb.
26, 2012, 5:52 PM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9107042/Companies-useapps-to-harvest-users-personal-information.html.
58. See 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/.
59. Id.
60. See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 918(RJH), 2012 WL 183896, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2012).
61. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
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Concepcion strictly examines whether the Federal Arbitration
Act preempts California case law holding certain arbitration
provisions unenforceable.62 The controlling holding results from
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito and Kennedy, and Justice Thomas’ concurrence.63
Concepcion examines § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
which states that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”64 California law had defined such
grounds to include unconscionability, as explained below.65
The case arose when the Concepcions sued AT&T for false
advertising and fraud after responding to an advertisement for “free”
phones for which AT&T charged $30.22 in sales tax.66 In connection
with their “free” purchase, the Concepcions executed a contract with
AT&T that provided for the arbitration of all disputes between the
parties and required that claims be brought in consumers’ “individual
capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class
or representative proceeding.”67 The agreement set forth several steps
the parties would follow to resolve disputes, including a short notice
of dispute over the AT&T website, a period in which AT&T could
settle the claim informally before the consumer was permitted to file a
Demand for Arbitration.68 It also provided some consumer-friendly
procedures for arbitration, including AT&T payment of plaintiffs’
costs for non-frivolous claims, the placement of arbitration in the
consumer’s jurisdiction, the option to proceed by telephone at the
consumer’s election, a prohibition on AT&T’s seeking attorney’s
fees, and a guaranteed payment of $7,500 if the consumer receives an
arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.69
Vincent and Liza Concepcion sued in the Southern District of
California in March 2006,70 and their complaint was consolidated
with a putative class action.71 In March 2008, AT&T moved to

62. See id. at 1746.
63. Id. at 1743
64. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010).
65. See infra text accompanying note 75.
66. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2009).
67. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
68. Id. at 1744.
69. Id.
70. Complaint at 1, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 3:06-cv-00675-DMSNLS (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006).
71. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
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compel arbitration.72 The plaintiffs opposed AT&T’s motion on the
basis that the arbitration provision of the agreement was
“unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law
because it disallowed class wide procedures.”73
The District Court denied AT&T’s motion in reliance on
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.74 In Discover Bank, the California
Supreme Court had held that where class action waivers in consumer
contracts of adhesion appear “in a setting in which disputes between
the [contracting] parties predictably involve small amounts of
damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,”
such a waiver exempting the drafting party from responsibility is
unconscionable.75 Concepcion recited the popular summary of this
holding, termed the “Discover Bank rule,” as stating that arbitration
agreements in adhesive contracts were unconscionable.76
Unconscionability in turn requires, under at least California law, both
a procedural and substantive element.77 The procedural element of
unconscionability turns on the presence of “oppression” or “surprise”
due to unequal bargaining power.78 The substantive element of
unconscionability turns on the presence of “overly harsh” or “onesided” results.79
Applying this framework to class-action waivers in arbitration
agreements, the Discover Bank court explained:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1745.
74. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv11167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *712 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal.
2005)).
75. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
76. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
77. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Pyschcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (Cal.
2000); accord Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108.
78. See Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114; accord Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108.
79. See id.
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property of another.” Under these circumstances, such waivers are
80
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.

The court further explained that, in practice, such agreements
“operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be
imposed under California law.”81 Future California opinions applied
this “Discover Bank rule” to find that adhesive contracts containing
arbitration agreements were unconscionable and unenforceable.82
In Concepcion, the majority negated the Discover Bank rule with
a focus on the fact that the rule deemed certain agreements
unconscionable because they required arbitration.83 Within that
framework, the majority believed that the FAA pre-empted the rule
because the rule stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in passing
the FAA.84 It held that the phrase in the FAA “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”
permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “‘generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration
or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to
arbitrate is at issue.”85
As a result, class action waivers and arbitration provisions
tucked into adhesive online terms should now be enforceable. If
enforced according to Concepcion, such waivers and arbitration
provisions prevent litigants from proceeding on a class wide basis.
Such simple provisions therefore function to prohibit any class action
against an online provider, absent some other grounds to render the
agreements unenforceable.
As discussed above, the majority of privacy-based claims
recently litigated involve very small measures of damages incurred
under the onus of a provider’s online terms. They proceed on a
contingency basis because the potential for class wide damages
motivates the plaintiff’s bar to risk resources in the hope of obtaining
a large aggregate judgment. However, if online providers can remove
80. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668
(West 2012)).
81. Id. at 1109.
82. See, e.g., Cohen v. DirectTV, Inc. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 819-20 (2006); Klussman v.
Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 739-40 (2005); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr.
3d 229, 237-38 (2005).
83. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
84. See id. at 1748.
85. See id. at 1746.
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the potential for a large aggregate judgment by requiring individual
arbitration of claims in online terms, it seems unlikely that any lawyer
will remain willing to bring a privacy-based claim for the thus-far
miniscule damages claimed by any individual litigant.
VI. THE INTERPRETATION OF AT&T V. CONCEPCION
Since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Concepcion was
published, it has been interpreted broadly by lower courts. While most
of the citing decisions have been in the employment context,86 a few
cases dealing with privacy considerations have applied Concepcion to
compel arbitration based on a provision in a form contract.87
In Wilson v. Cash America International Inc., a Northern District
of Texas Court compelled the arbitration of claims of common law
invasion of privacy by intrusion and violations of Texas consumer
statutes.88 The contract governing the parties’ relationship was not a
clickwrap or browsewrap agreement, but a series of credit service
organization form contracts.89 The court primarily relied upon the
Supreme Court’s opinion in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.90
CompuCredit held that, where a statute is silent on whether claims
arising under that statute can proceed under arbitration, the FAA
requires that an agreement to arbitrate in the instrument governing the
parties’ relationship be enforced.91 However, the court also noted that,
“to whatever extent plaintiff is contending that the class action
provisions of the arbitration agreements cannot be enforced, the court
notes that the contention would be at odds with [Concepcion].”92 This
suggests that the application of Concepcion won’t turn on any
analysis of unconscionability specific to California law.

86. See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 10 Civ. 3332(KMW)(MHD), 2012 WL
130420 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) for a case highlighting the controversy surrounding this
application.
87. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cash Am. Int’l Inc., No. 4:11-CV-421-A, 2012 WL 310936 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 1, 2012); Aneke v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Civil Action No. 111008(GK), 2012 WL 266878 (D. D.C. Jan. 31, 2012); Khanna v. Am. Express Co., No. 11 Civ.
6245(JSR), 2011 WL 6382603 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2011); Bailey v. Household Fin. Corp., No.
10cv857 WQH (RBB), 2011 WL 5118723 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011); Brewer v. Missouri Title
Loans, No. SC90647, 2012 WL 716878 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012).
88. Wilson, 2012 WL 310936.
89. See id. at *1.
90. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
91. See Wilson, 2012 WL 310936, at *3-4 (summarizing CompuCredit v. Greenwood).
This analysis also prompts a question as to whether a statute which by its terms prohibited
enforcement in an arbitrable forum would alter the result.
92. Wilson, 2012 WL 310936, at *4 n.3.
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Next, in Bailey v. Household Finance Corp., the Southern
District of California compelled arbitration of claims including the
violation of California’s Invasion of Privacy Act.93 The opinion
permitted the defendant to compel arbitration in what would
otherwise be an untimely fashion because, until Concepcion, its
arbitration agreement would have been assumed unenforceable under
California law.94
In Khanna v. American Express Co., the Southern District of
New York compelled arbitration of claims including violations of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.95
American Express had mailed the plaintiff a replacement credit card
and enclosed a copy of a Cardmember Agreement that provided for
acceptance by “us[ing] the [a]ccount (or . . . sign[ing] or keep[ing] the
card).”96 It also provided simply that either party could elect to
resolve the claim by arbitration and such an election would remove
both parties’ rights to a jury trial.97 Finally, it required any arbitration
be conducted on an individual basis.98 The court found no Utah law
(the contract’s governing law) to suggest that a generally applicable
contract defense should be applied and compelled individual
arbitration.99 While the user was mailed this agreement, note that the
court did not require an affirmative act to indicate assent before
enforcing the agreement against the user.100
In Aneke v. American Express, the District of Columbia Court
compelled arbitration of claims under the Right to Financial Privacy
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq., over the sharing of plaintiffs’ phone
numbers with call centers outside the United States without
consent.101 The opinion does not discuss the assent process for the
Cardmember Agreements that contained the arbitration provision,
which included a waiver of the right to class proceedings and a
requirement to arbitrate on an individual basis. 102 The Cardmember
93. Bailey v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 10cv857 WQH (RBB), 2011 WL 5118723 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2011).
94. See id. at *9.
95. Khanna v. Am. Express Co., No. 11 Civ. 6245(JSR), 2011 WL 6382603 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 14, 2011).
96. Id. at *2.
97. See id.
98. See id. at *2.
99. See id. at *2-5.
100. See id. at *3-5.
101. Aneke v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Civil Action No. 11-1008(GK), 2012
WL 266878 (D. D.C. Jan. 31, 2012).
102. See id. at *2-3.
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Agreements did not contain provisions for informal dispute resolution
or what could be termed consumer-friendly resolution procedures like
those in the Concepcion agreement.103 Arbitration was compelled
nonetheless.104
Collectively, these cases suggest that Concepcion has not been
applied to rely upon the presence of a consumer-favorable arbitration
procedure. Similarly, none of these courts has focused on the presence
of absence of a class-action waiver or a provision requiring arbitration
on an individual basis. Instead, it has been applied broadly to require
individual arbitration where even an adhesive consumer contract
states merely that claims will be arbitrated—even absent a user’s
affirmative act of assent.
VII.THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AT&T V. CONCEPCION
The law governing online terms of service, which almost
exclusively deems such terms enforceable contracts, suggests that any
online business can shield itself from class-action suits merely by
including language along these lines in its online terms:
Any claims between the parties under these Terms shall be
resolved by arbitration on an individual basis. [The consumer] will
have no right to (1) litigate that claim in court or have a jury trial on
that claim or (2) participate in a representative capacity or as a

103. See id.
104. See id. at *8. But see Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, No. SC90647, 2012 WL
716878, at *8-9 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that absence of any mechanism for informal
complaint resolution distinguished Concepcion in reliance on Thomas’ concurrence where
defendant could elect to use the courts to obtain its own relief but plaintiff could not). Note,
however, that Brewer was decided simultaneously with the submission of this article and it is
unclear what result would arise from an appeal to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the draft
arbitration provision I suggest below requires mutual arbitration, rather than arbitration in the
Company’s discretion for this reason. Other recent cases have hinged on the disparity in
bargaining power between the parties, but never where electronic form terms were used. See,
e.g., Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11–1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, *6-11 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (refusing to enforce pre-printed agreement’s arbitration clause because the
presence of the clause was not clear to the consumer and therefore the agreement was
procedurally unconscionable as well as because the high arbitration fees were substantively
unconscionable); Trompeter v. Ally Financial, Inc., No. C 12–00392 CW, 2012 WL 1980894,
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (refusing to enforce arbitration provision on the reverse of the
printed agreement and agreement was one-sided because drafting party could seek re-arbitration
but consumer could not and consumer was responsible for excessive arbitration fees); NAACP
of Camden County East v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011); cf. Vernon v. Qwest Commns. Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 09–cv–01840–RBJ–CBS,
2012 WL 768125, *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2012) (enforcing arbitration provision where
arbitration term was easy for consumer to find in part because of continued display on the
company website). See infra Part VII.
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member of any class have any of claimants pertaining to any claim
subject to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision will be final and
binding [except as set forth by the Company herein].
In order for such a provision to function as a class-action shield,
however, it must be a part of an enforceable contract with the user.
Therefore, assent to the terms must have been effective, likely
through a clickwrap or quasi-clickwrap mechanism. In addition, any
update to the applicable terms likely must be performed both (1) in
accordance with those terms’ intrinsic procedures for revision and (2)
in a manner providing sufficient notice to the user that there has been
some update, or that arbitration specifically is now required under the
revised terms.
At least one California case, decided pre-Concepcion, has held
the ex poste addition of an arbitration provision was unenforceable as
unconscionable where the user could only reject the revised terms by
canceling the service.105 In light of Concepcion’s specific rejection of
California’s unconscionability determination based upon the very use
of arbitration for such claims, we might expect that unconscionability
based on the chosen assent process might still invalidate such
provisions. However, this distinction does not appear to have been
tested in court.
By using a valid update procedure, however, it seems that any
online business can now plug language into its terms of service that
shields it from class litigation and forces its users to arbitrate. The
plaintiff’s bar is unlikely to spend tens or hundreds of thousands of its
own dollars to litigate a claim worth less than $100 in contingency
award. Given the shift in law instigated by Concepcion, it seems
reasonable to expect that few plaintiffs’ lawyers will be bringing
contingency actions against online businesses with arbitration clauses
in their terms of service.
VIII.THE DIFFERENCE SOME FRAUD MAKES
Expressly exempt from Section 2 of the FAA, and therefore from
105. See Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 n.5 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“Although the Wireless Service Agreement provides that Kaltwasser has the right to
accept any amendments or reject the amendments and hold Cingular to the terms of the original
contract, the Amendment specifies no means of rejecting the modified terms, other than
cancelling service. California courts have held that such an offer is procedurally
unconscionable.”) (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002)). Kaltwasser does not rely on the Discover Bank holding overturned by Concepcion in
this respect; rather it is the unconscionability of the update procedure, as opposed to the
arbitration itself, in Discover Bank. See id.
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the purview of Concepcion, are circumstances of fraud.106 However,
as a practical matter, I argue that only fraud in the execution can
preserve the ability to bring a privacy class action based on online
consumer transactions where the allegedly controlling terms contain
and arbitration clause.
One can imagine that a challenger to terms such as the April
Fools provision mentioned above,107 transferring ownership of one’s
immortal soul in exchange for access to an informational website
about gaming, would argue that the challenger’s assent resulted from
fraud. In particular, one might argue that the entire website was a trick
crafted to collect a user’s valuable immortal soul. This sort of
argument is in the vein of fraud. One might also argue that
OKCupid’s failure to disclose advertising practices in its privacy
policy was fraudulent in that it misled users into thinking they could
speak freely to potential mates absent third party scrutiny. However,
the involvement of any kind of fraud will not be sufficient to trump
the class-action killing power of Concepcion.
Fraud in the inducement occurs where a signatory to an
agreement knows what she is signing but her consent is induced by
fraud.108 The classic example is a purposeful misrepresentation by the
counterparty about a quality or characteristic of the product or service
purchased by the induced party. If proven, fraud in the inducement
renders a contract voidable.109 However, because such contracts are
voidable rather than void abinitio, one would be required to prove
their voidability in court.110 To do so, one would have to abide by the
forum selection, arbitration, or other litigation constraining provision
in the contract. Therefore, even if assent to online terms were induced
by fraud, so long as the user “knew” she was assenting to or clicking
through terms of use for that site, an arbitration provision in those
terms would function to prevent class actions.
106. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010).
107. See supra, note 58.
108. See 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, CONTRACTS § 297 (10th ed. 2005).
109. See id.
110. See Davis v. Avvo, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2352-T-27TBM, 2011 WL 4063282, at *5 n.14
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2011) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)). Note that
decisions applying Concepcion have left open the possibility of defeating arbitration with
“fraud” generally, but have not explained how such a defense would leap this procedural hurdle
and have had different results from the cases discussed in Part VI supra. See, e.g., Brewer v.
Missouri Title Loans, No. SC90647, 2012 WL 716878 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (relying on absence
of defendant payments or informal resolution mechanism of arbitration provision in thirteen
loan agreements plaintiff claimed she did not read or fully understand when she signed in order
to find agreement unconscionable).
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The same is not true of fraud in the execution, also sometimes
called fraud in the inception. Essentially, fraud in the execution goes
to the inception or execution of the agreement, such that the promisor
“is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know
what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all,
mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void.”111 Because the
assent obtained by fraud in the execution is ineffective, no contract is
formed and the contract is void ab initio.112 An arbitration provision
contained in terms of use obtained by fraud in the execution will
therefore be unenforceable, allowing class-wide litigation to proceed
without the onus of the website host’s self-serving mandates
regarding the litigation process.
A California appeals court recently held as void online terms of
use assented to in light of fraud in the execution.113 Duick v. Toyota
concerned a Toyota online marketing scheme of a curious nature.114
Any user of the Toyota Matrix website provided Toyota with her
friend’s name, email, and physical address, designating that person
(the “Player”) as a participant in the “Your Other You ‘interactive
experience.’”115 The Player would then receive an email appearing to
originate with the recommending individual inviting the Player to
click a hyperlink (identified in an unclear manner with Toyota) that
led to a landing page entitled “Personality Evaluation.”116 On this
page, Player could click to “begin,” at which point Player was
directed to a page entitled “Personality Evaluation Terms and
Conditions,” where Player had to, according to defendants, scroll
through the length of terms and conditions before being allowed to
proceed by clicking a box labeled “I have read and agree to the terms
and conditions.”117
The initial paragraph of these terms was somewhat consistent
with a “Personality Evaluation,” in that it said Player had been invited
by someone who knows them to participate in an “interactive
experience.”118 Further down, these terms included that Player would
engage in a 5 day digital experience where Player would receive
111. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996).
112. See Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 514, 517 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011).
113. Id. at 514.
114. Id. at 515.
115. Id. at 515-16.
116. Id. at 515.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 516.
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“email messages, phone calls, and/or text messages” from Toyota, as
well as an individual-basis arbitration provision.119 Plaintiff Player
purportedly clicked that she had “read and agree[d] to the terms and
conditions,” though her testimony was that she did not recall doing
so, and in fact had technical difficulties viewing all of the terms
page.120 Nonetheless, Plaintiff Player soon began receiving emails
from a man calling himself “Sebastian Bowler,” linked to a MySpace
page for an alcoholic soccer hooligan, explaining over the five day
period that he was coming to stay at her house, bringing his
spontaneously vomiting dog, running from the cops, and sticking her
with the bill for a hotel room he’d destroyed.121 She sued Toyota for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and false
advertising, among other claims.122
The Duick court thought this was one circumstance where,
without negligence on her part, Plaintiff Player had attached her
signature to a paper “assuming it to be a paper of a different
character.”123 It noted that the terms were called “Personality
Evaluation Terms and Conditions,” which could have led Plaintiff
Player to believe she was going to participate in a personality
evaluation and nothing more—not that she would be subject to a
prank.124 The court noted that (1) the terms regarding an “interactive
experience” were vague and (2) even if Plaintiff Player had seen the
term regarding receiving emails, she could not have known what sort
of emails she would receive.125 Because Toyota “misrepresented and
concealed” the true nature of what was coming to Player Plaintiff,
Toyota “‘deprived [Plaintiff Player] of a reasonable opportunity to
learn the character’ of the putative agreement, regardless of her access
to the agreement’s terms.”126 The appeals court therefore affirmed the
district court’s denial of Toyota’s motion to compel arbitration.127
Fraud in the execution appears to be, at this early stage in the
history of Concepcion, the only argument a litigant can make to
attempt proceed with claims on a class wide basis, without observing
an arbitration clause, where the relationship is purportedly governed
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 516-17.
See id. at 517.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 517-518.
Id.
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by a single version of online terms.
IX. CONCLUSION
The holding in Concepcion suggests that it will be nearly
impossible—absent fraud in the execution—to bring a class action
suit for any claim, including a privacy claim, arising from one’s use
of a website with an arbitration provision in its terms of use. Such
terms are most often deemed enforceable, particularly where a user is
expected to know of their existence.
For websites that haven’t included such a provision, it appears
the same result can be obtained with a simple amendment to those
terms, provided the website is willing to ask users to check a box to
confirm their assent to the revised terms.
In the case of OKCupid,128 a harm in the form of insurance
premiums increased by several hundred dollars per use, for example
(resulting from advertisers’ disclosure of users’ profile information)
could become virtually unredressable vis a vis OKCupid. This would
depend upon OKCupid or its analogue having imposed a notice and
assent procedure for its revised terms of the “clickwrap” or “quasiclickwrap” variety. It may also depend on what information about the
update OKCupid presents: an accurate summary, a misleading
summary, or the full revised terms. Perhaps there would be an
argument for fraud in the execution where an update was merely to
add an arbitration provision to prevent class action suits but hid or
misrepresented that purpose. However, outside of that presumably
rare circumstance, OKCupid and its analogues can likely use
Concepcion to shield themselves from any and all class action suits
over their behavior. All they need do is ask users to click
absentmindedly through an amendment.
It seems unlikely that this was the Supreme Court’s purpose in
ruling as it did in Concepcion. Nonetheless, the holding appears to
have made online privacy suits even harder to win than they already
were.

128.

See infra Part II.

